Introduction
The idea that environmental regulation can foster the ability of a country to improve its competitiveness has been proposed by several scholars and has attracted the attention of policy makers. The study of the so called 'Porter Hypothesis' (PH) (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) has revolved around the examination of whether more stringent environmental regulations can improve or hamper better economic performance of firms, sectors or countries. The general idea shared by policy makers and economists is that environmental protection can generate extra costs for firms therefore causing their domestic and international performance to fall. Following this point of view implies that firms have to sustain costs to comply with environmental regulations. For example, if a firm has to pay an environmental tax, this causes higher operating costs which could induce a drop in planned productive investments. On the contrary, in the Porter's idea, pollution can be considered as a waste of resources that, if properly handled, could improve firms' performance. In particular, environmental regulations can give rise to mechanisms leading to o↵set the additional costs introduced because of the regulation, causing an increase in performance. They could help to signal ine ciencies in the way resources are used, or could create the conditions for regulated actors to exploit first mover advantages once the regulation will be adopted by competitors.
From an empirical point of view, di↵erent versions of the PH have been tested. Ja↵e and Palmer (1997) distinguish among three di↵erent versions, namely the 'narrow', the 'weak' and the 'strong' version of the PH. The first is based on the idea that only certain types of environmental regulations, such as market-based (flexible) environmental regulations (e.g. tradable permits), can foster competitiveness. On the other hand, the weak version argues that environmental regulations (of any kind) can foster innovations, with no a priori expectation about the net e↵ect on competitiveness and productivity. Finally, the strong version refers to the fact that environmental regulations, either market-based or standard-based, can lead to improved competitiveness and productivity through innovation induced by the regulation, allowing as a consequence, to more than o↵set compliance costs. Empirical studies do not reach unanimous findings with respect to proving these e↵ects to be at work. For this reason, in this paper, we dig deeper into this issue by providing empirical evidence on the role played by energy taxes as drivers of innovation and productivity. We focus on the manufacturing sectors of 7 European countries over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The importance of investigating the e↵ect for European countries lies not only in the fact that they have been among the first to adopt stricter environmental policies, but also on the lack of comprehensive analysis of the e↵ects of energy taxes on measures of competitiveness based on European countries.
Our contributions to the literature are threefold. In the first place, with the exception of the paper by Leiter et al. (2011) , environmental taxes, and in particular, in our case energy taxes, are scarcely investigated as types of regulations potentially inducing PH hypothesis to hold. In the second place, we examine the two versions of the PH: that is, we study the e↵ect of energy taxes on innovation to examine the weak version of the PH and we investigate the extent to which environmental taxes a↵ect productivity (directly and through innovation) to test the strong version of the PH. The peculiarity of our approach lies in the fact that, whereas most of the previous analyses only focuses on the e↵ects generated by environmental stringency in the same sector (e.g. Kneller and Manderson (2012) ), we consider both intra and inter-industry e↵ects of stringency measures by means of annual input-output data. Thirdly, we do not only examine the e↵ect considering direct relationships, that is from taxes to innovation or productivity, but we try to shed light on the possibility that innovation activities are one of the indirect channels through which the e↵ect of energy taxes on productivity can become evident.
Our main findings suggest that both the weak and strong version of the PH are confirmed, with our measures of environmental regulatory stringency being positively related to both innovation (induced innovation -weak version of the PH) and productivity (strong version of the PH). The strongest e↵ect appears to be related to downstream regulatory stringency. However, when we investigate the role of innovation as a mediating factor which allows sectors to more than o↵set the costs of regulation, we find no significant mediation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the relevant empirical and theoretical literature. In section 3 we describe the data. In section 4 we discuss our empirical models. In section 5 we present our results. Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
The starting point of the PH focuses on the likely beneficial e↵ects that properly designed environmental regulations can have on competitiveness. In particular, Porter and van der Linde (1995) claim that more stringent environmental policies do not necessarily cause losses of competitiveness. The reason is that environmental regulations may have beneficial e↵ects on production e ciency and technological improvements and they stimulate en-vironmental awareness of firms about di↵erent (and more environmentallyfriendly) manners to handle the production process. This could result in an increase in environmental regulatory pressure also to firms that are connected to regulated firms through value chains relationships such as customers and suppliers.
The taxonomy of the di↵erent versions of the PH proposed by Ja↵e and Palmer (1997) highlights three di↵erent versions of the PH: the 'weak' version relates to the impact of environmental regulations on firm's innovation activities. Contrasting results have been reached on this side of the issue: in this respect, Ja↵e and Palmer (1997) , in a sectoral study about US manufacturing sectors, estimate how pollution abatement costs are related to patent applications as well as total R&D expenditures, finding a positive relationship (R&D expenditures increase by 0.15 % due to a pollution abatement cost increase of 1 %). On the other hand, the e↵ect on patent applications is not statistically significant. However, they adopt a broad approach, that is considering not only environmental innovations but all types of innovative output. Di↵erently, the analysis by Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) , analyzing US manufacturing industries over the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] , is restricted to environmentally-related patents, for which is found a positive, even though small, relationship. The bidirectional linkages between emissions and innovation activities is studied by Carrion-Flores and Innes (2010) using US sectoral data: the main findings suggest a negative relationship in both directions, even though the e↵ect on long run emission reduction which is induced by innovation is small. Popp (2006) provides evidence that the introduction of environmental regulations on sulphur dioxide (SO2) in the United States, and on nitrogen dioxides in Germany and Japan, was shortly followed by a very significant increase in the number of relevant patents.
A positive e↵ect is also found by Kneller and Manderson (2012) , who analyze the case of 25 UK manufacturing industries over the period 2000-2006, considering the role played by expenditure in pollution control in a↵ecting innovation measured with environmental R&D. Thier findings suggest that the positive e↵ects are driven by the crowding out e↵ect of environmental R&D with respect to other types of R&D investments.
Similarly to our cross-country approach, Johnstone et al. (2012) carry out an analysis based on an unbalanced panel of 77 countries over the years 2001 and 2007 using data from the European Patent O ce (EPO) World Patent Statistical (PATSTAT) database and the World Economic Forum's (WEF) 'Executive Opinion Survey'. Their findings confirm that higher environmental stringency positively a↵ects environmental innovation.
The strong version of the PH entails the estimation of the e↵ects of environmental regulations on the economic performance of firms, sectors or countries. Also in this case empirical results have produced mixed results. Earlier studies generally did not find evidence of the strong version of the PH. For example, Gollop and Roberts (1983) find that the introduction of regulations to reduce sulphur emissions, targeted at American electrical utilities, caused a decrease in productivity by 43 % in the '70s. Ja↵e and Stavins (1995) , in their review, analyze some papers which find a negative impact of environmental regulation on productivity.
More recently, a positive e↵ect seems to emerge finding confirmation of the strong version of the PH. Hamamoto (2006) finds that environmental regulations have had a positive e↵ect on productivity in Japanese manufacturing sectors, through positive e↵ects on R&D. Alpay et al. (2002) find that the productivity of the Mexican food processing industry increased following the implementation of more stringent environmental regulations. Lanoie et al. (2008) put forward empirical evidence on the e↵ect that a stringent environmental regulation may have on industrial productivity in 17 Canadian manufacturing industries. They consider a dynamic model finding that the contemporaneous e↵ect of environmental regulation on productivity is negative, but a positive impact is detected when using lagged variables of environmental regulation 1 . All reviewed empirical analyses have in common the investigation of the e↵ect of environmental regulation on innovation, competitiveness and productivity based on the implicit assumption that the inducement e↵ect of environmental regulatory stringency regards only firms, sectors and countries directly targeted by environmental regulations (within-sector regulation). This implicit assumption is straightforward when investigating the adoption of innovations. However, it is reasonable to assume that a wider variety of actors is involved in the phase of invention and development of new or improved technologies aimed at reacting to environmental regulations. Recent theoretical contributions stressed the relevance of suppliers, in 1 The e↵ect of environmental regulations has not been examined only with respect to productivity but also considering whether they a↵ect investment decisions. Gray and Shadbegian (1998) and Gray and Shadbegian (2003) find that U.S. paper mills investment decisions in less pollutant type of production processes have been caused by more stringent air and water regulations. However, they also detect an overall negative e↵ect on productivity due to the process of diverting those investments from production activities. In the same way, Arimura et al. (2007) recognize that a positive and significant relationship can occur between the stringency of environmental regulations and investment in R&D. Leiter et al. (2011) underlines how environmental regulations, measured by industry's total current expenditures or a country-industry's revenue from environmental taxes, can a↵ect di↵erent types of investments such as gross investment in tangible goods, machinery, construction and productive investments. Their findings apply to 9 manufacturing industries examined for 21 European countries over the period 1998-2007. the form of upstream firms and sectors, as a crucial source of technology to cope with environmental regulations.
In this respect, Greaker (2006) builds a two-sector model in which a stringent environmental regulation a↵ects the polluting industry (downstream) which abates pollution by means of pollution abatement technologies supplied by the pollution abatement service sector (upstream) . In this setting, stringent environmental regulation downstream, by boosting the demand for pollution abatement equipment, stimulate innovation and entry in the pollution abatement service sectors.
The model by Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) builds on Greaker (2006) but evaluates the role of R&D in the upstream pollution abatement service sector as well as the export performance of the pollution abatement service sector itself. While the result about the positive e↵ect of a stringent environmental regulation on the competitiveness of the downstream polluting sector remains unchanged, they show that a stringent environmental regulation has an ambiguous e↵ect on the export performance of the pollution abatement service sector. The first best is reached when the stringent environmental regulation is combined with an R&D subsidy.
Finally, Heyes and Kapur (2011) outline a model in which both the regulated polluting firm (downstream) and the specialized supplier of the abatement technology (upstream) perform R&D aimed at obtaining a temporary monopoly (by means of a patent) for the supply of the pollution abatement technology. Even though the objective of their article is to investigate a dynamically optimal level of regulatory stringency, it is the first theoretical contribution explicitly allowing both the polluting firm and the specialized suppliers of pollution abatement technology to perform innovation activities.
These recent theoretical contributions on the role of inter-sectoral linkages in the literature on the PH have no empirical counterpart.
Empirical model
[ Figure 1 about here]
The empirical approach we adopt here is described by Figure 1 . Following Lanoie et al. (2011) , we aim at investigating the full chain of causality links between environmental regulatory stringency (here energy taxes) and final performance (here productivity), with environmental regulatory stringency a↵ecting productivity either directly or through its e↵ect on innovation. To deal with possible lags in the adaptation to new regulatory conditions and to avoid issues of reverse causality, our indicators of energy tax intensity (as well as all our control variables) are included in the regressions with a lag of one year 2 . We implement our empirical model in two steps. In a first step, we investigate separately the direct links between the stringency of environmental regulation (either within-sector, upstream and downstream environmental regulation) and the various measures of performance (innovation and productivity). In a second step, we jointly assess the e↵ect of the stringency of environmental regulation on productivity by decomposing the overall e↵ect in a direct e↵ect and an indirect (mediated) e↵ect transmitted by innovation.
Direct links between environmental regulations and competitiveness
We estimate a knowledge production function (path (1) in Figure 1 ), separately from a productivity equation (path (2) in Figure 1 ). In a second step, we investigate the extent to which innovation acts as mediator when assessing the overall e↵ect of environmental regulatory stringency on productivity performance. Several problems can a↵ect panel data regressions. As a matter of fact, residuals could be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and display cross-sectional dependence. Through specific tests, we found all these problems in our data and therefore we use the estimators proposed by Hoechle (2007) , in which standard errors are estimated by means of the Driscoll-Kraay estimator. First, for patents only, we estimate a baseline model without any indicator of environmental stringency, in order to assess the role of our set of control variables. In a second set of specifications, we investigate separately the e↵ect of within-sector, upstream and downstream environmental stringency. Then, we put all the three measures in the same regression equation. Finally, we add, respectively, an interaction term between within-sector environmental regulatory stringency and upstream and downstream environmental regulatory stringency to investigate whether they act as substitutes or complements.
Knowledge production function
Path (1) in Figure 1 investigates the induced-innovation e↵ect of environmental regulatory stringency. That is we consider the e↵ect of environmental regulatory stringency on patents as indicated by the weak PH. We investigate this e↵ect in the general framework of a knowledge production function (Griliches, 1990) , with the logarithm of total patents as dependent variable 3 . It is to be noted that we use only a measure of aggregate patents rather than 'green' patents as our aim is to test the impact of regulation on overall innovation e↵ort, following the approach of Ja↵e and Palmer (1997) .
In principle, it would be interesting to investigate the extent to which regulation a↵ects specific kinds of technologies, especially the ones more strictly linked to improvement of energy e ciency or alternative ways of generating energy. The first di culty is to disentangle with su cient precision those specific technologies that are more likely to be influenced by more expensive energy input due to taxes. Energy e ciency is a very general and broad concept which could be pursued by a wide variety of technological innovations. Moreover, the response to more expensive energy inputs could go beyond simple improvements of energy e ciency, with more radical changes in processes and products 4 . To our knowledge, the only work on European countries which estimates the e↵ect of environmental regulatory stringency (more specifically, what they define endogenous regulatory stringency) on environmental patents with a sectoral perspective is the work by Ghisetti and Quatraro (2013) 5 . They use actual patents by sector and region by aggregating firm-level data (ORBIS database) for Italy, then identifying environmental patents based on IPC classes. The main limitation of that kind of approach in our context, however, is the limited coverage of patents matched by using firm-level data such as the ORBIS database. The possible alternative, that is assigning environmental patents to sectors based on 'static' IPC-Nace concordances (as we do in this work) together with identifying environmental patents based on a static list of IPC classes, is likely to generate some distorsions due to the fact that there is an a priori link of specific technologies (e.g. environmental technologies identified through IPC classes) to specific sectors (through the static IPC-Nace concordance).
The novelty of our approach is that of testing the e↵ect on the dependent variable by also considering the stringency of the downstream and upstream sector through the use of input-output matrices. If patents mainly cover 'product' innovations, we should expect an increasing 'demand' for better technologies by downstream sectors towards their suppliers of technologies as a consequence of more stringent environmental regulations. Secondly, if the upstream sector is a↵ected by increasing costs due to regulation and part of these costs result in higher prices 6 , its buyers (downstream sectors) are induced to innovate in order to deal with the new relative prices of intermediate goods (induced innovation). We also consider the case in which the e↵ects of downstream and upstream regulation can interact with 'withinsector' regulation to generate an impact on innovation. As inputs in the knowledge production function we include investment in research and development (logarithm of R&D expenditure), the stock of available knowledge (logarithm of patent stock), the quality of human capital (proxied by the logarithm of average wage) as well as the logarithm of total employees to control for the scale of the sector. Moreover, we include year dummies to account, among other things, for changes in the propensity to patent common to all sectors and countries.
Productivity equation
To test the strong version of the PH, we estimate the direct e↵ect of our measures of environmental stringency on productivity, that is the path (2) in Figure 1 . In this case environmental regulatory stringency can contribute to increase the economic performance, here measured in terms of TFP (total factor productivity) or labour productivity, because firms have the technological capabilities to o↵set the costs implied by environmental policy. In this part of the analysis, for example, environmental regulation might stimulate and accelerate organizational changes, with positive productivity e↵ects, and might generate the conditions for the creation of new markets, as suggested by Porter and van der Linde (1995) , with positive e↵ects on productivity.
Mediated e↵ects
The literature on the PH emphasizes the role of induced innovation as a channel to (more than) o↵set environmental compliance costs. However, with few exceptions such as Hamamoto (2006) and Yang et al. (2012) , empirical analyses either focus on the induced-innovation e↵ect only (e.g. Johnstone et al. (2012) , path (1) in Figure 1 ) or they investigate the overall e↵ect environmental regulatory stringency on indicators of economic performance such as profits or productivity (e.g. Lanoie et al. (2011) ) with no explicit investigation of the mediating e↵ect of innovation. Our approach aims at filling this gap by decomposing the overall e↵ect of our measures of environmental regulatory stringency on productivity between a direct e↵ect and an indirect e↵ect, the last one being transmitted (mediated) by innovation.
[ Figure 2 about here]
In addition to the productivity equation (dashed arrows in Figure 2 ), in which we have our productivity measure as dependent variable (y cs,t ) and, as regressors, the various measures of environmental regulatory stringency (X cs,t ) and the mediating variable (m cs,t ), we also estimate an equation for the mediating variable (m cs,t -here innovation measured by patents) in which we include the baseline controls (Z cs,t ) already described above and the measures of environmental regulatory stringency (X cs,t ).
In this framework, environmental regulatory stringency influences productivity directly ( ) as well as indirectly through the mediator (↵ ⇥ ), with the overall e↵ect given by + ↵ ⇥ . Being the indirect and overall e↵ects non-linear combinations of parameters, they follow a non-normal distributions. For that reason, as suggested by Preacher et al. (2007) , we report standard errors computed with bootstrap (500 replications). A common test to assess the presence of mediation is the Sobel test (Preacher and Hayes, 2008) . The test could be interpreted in two di↵erent alternative ways. First, starting from a simple regression in the form of y cs,t = X 0 cs,t + ✓ cs + ⌧ t + ⌘ cs,t , mediation is relevant if the vector experiences a statistically significant change when the mediator m cs,t is added as regressor. A second approach, equivalent but probably easier to interpret, is to test the significance of indirect e↵ects (↵ ⇥ ) in equation 1.
This approach allows us to investigate also the path (3) of Figure 1 , thus providing a comprehensive picture of the full chain of causality between environmental regulatory stringency and productivity.
Data
Our analysis is based on a longitudinal dataset composed by 13 manufacturing sectors 7 for seven European countries 8 and the period 2001-2007. The panel includes 621 observations for a total of 89 sector-country pairs 9 .
Dependent variables
We use two sets of dependent variables to describe the performance of European manufacturing sectors. Innovative output is measured by means of EPO (European Patent O ce) patent applications assigned to each sector. Patents have been assigned to manufacturing sectors according to the IPCNace concordance table done by Schmoch et al. (2003) .
As robustness check, we tested our results with the newly released IPC-Nace concordance table, based on text similarity algorithms, prepared by Lybbert and Zolas (2013) . The use of patent data, even though a↵ected by some drawbacks such as the fact of being biased towards product innovations, has been considered as one of the best measures of technological innovations as the focus is on outputs rather than inputs (as the case of R&D expenditures). Performance in terms of productivity is measured by means of a TFP index (EUKLEMS 10 ) and, as a robustness check, in terms of labour productivity (value added per employee, from the WIOD 11 database).
7 Nace rev. 1.1. DA: food products, beverages and tobacco. DB: textiles and textile products. DC: leather and leather products. DD: wood and wood products. DE: pulp, paper and paper products, publishing and printing. DF: coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel. DG: chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers. DH: rubber and plastic products. DI: other non-metallic mineral products. DJ: basic metals and fabricated metal products. DK: machinery and equipment n.e.c.. DL: electrical and optical equipment. DM: transport equipment. DN: manufacturing n.e.c..
8 Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL) and Sweden (SE).
9 The potential size of the panel was of 637 observations. However, sector DF is missing for the entire period for Austria and Czech Republic and sector DL is missing in 2006 and 2007 for Sweden.
10 http://www.euklems.net. 11 World Input Output Database, http://www.wiod.org.
Independent variables
4.2.1 Environmental regulation: within-sector, upstream and downstream regulation In the empirical literature environmental regulations are usually proxied by pollution abatement costs (e.g. Shadbegian and Gray (2005) ) or the amount of pollutant emissions (e.g. Xing and Kolstad (2002) ). Instead, in this paper, our main variable of interest (environmental regulatory stringency) is proxied by energy taxes. Our idea is that the higher the amount of taxes, the tighter is the regulation. Data on energy taxes are characterized by nice features which make them suitable for our purposes. First, data are available with sectoral breakdown for all economic branches as opposed to environmental protection expenditure, generally unavailable or aggregated for non-manufacturing sectors. Being available with great detail for all sectors allows to build reliable indicators of upstream and downstream measures of stringency. Second, they are a continuous and time-varying measures of environmental regulatory stringency, di↵erently from alternative discrete measures related to the introduction of specific environmental regulations. The use of energy taxes also brings about some serious limitations. First, while the outcome of energy taxes, which is making fossil fuels directly or indirectly more expensive, has important environmental implications, the motivation behind the introduction of energy taxes is often not related to environmental issues. Among other purposes, energy taxes are introduced as a relatively e cient source of tax revenue (due to the inelastic nature of energy demand) or they may act as strategic fiscal tools to improve energy security (relevant for countries with limited natural and mineral resources) or to translate part of the fiscal burden on foreign producers of energy. Second, despite their relevance and pervasiveness, they represent just one among many regulatory instruments for environmental purposes. Finally, in times of volatile energy prices, changes in energy taxes represent a relatively small fraction of the changes in total gross energy prices.
We use three di↵erent variables as measures of environmental regulatory stringency: within-sector intensity 12 of energy taxes, upstream average intensity of energy taxes and downstream average intensity of energy taxes. An estimate of the revenue from energy and, more generally, environmental taxes with a sectoral breakdown is provided by Eurostat in the database 'Environmental taxes by economic activity'
13 . Regulation 691/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council requires Member States to submit to Eurostat information on the revenue from environmentally related taxes by economic activities.
Upstream and downstream energy tax intensities have been computed by weighting the intensity of energy taxes (per unit of value added) of all other production sectors of the economy, including other industrial sectors, agriculture and all service sectors. Weights have been built by using the annual input-output tables of the WIOD database that have the advantage of being available for all years. Being Z the square input-output matrix of domestic intermediate inputs, x the column vector of gross domestic output and i the summation column vector, the weighting matrix for upstream sectors is given by Z < Z 0 i > 1 while the weighting matrix for downstream sectors is given by Z < x > 1 . What is missing from this weighting approach is regulation 'embodied' in imported intermediate inputs and regulation 'embodied' in the part of export related to intermediate inputs of partner countries. While estimates of inter-sectoral cross-country flows of intermediate inputs is available in WIOD, no comprehensive information on energy taxes (especially with a sectoral breakdown) for many trading partners is currently available.
Controls
We employ specific controls for each category of dependent variables. We use total employment (in terms of headcount, from the WIOD database) as a variable of size of the sector. Innovation input is measured with R&D expenditure (from OECD Anberd). Knowledge stock is measured by means of the stock of EPO patents. The stock is built with the perpetual inventory method starting from 1977 (year in which the European Patent O ce has been created), assuming a depreciation rate of 15 percent. In this case, we use patent assigned to sectors by using the IPC-Nace concordance table recently developed by Lybbert and Zolas (2013) instead of the concordance proposed by Schmoch et al. (2003) . As a measure of human capital we build an indicator of average wage (compensation to employees -Eurostat -per employee -WIOD). Finally, as a measure of market structure, we use the share of big firms (more than 250 employees) by sector (OECD Structural Business Statistics). Table 1 reports average values for some of our relevant variables by country and by sector while Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. We can note that, in terms of innovation output (number of patents per 1,000 employees), the Netherlands stands out, with more than 4 patents per thousand employees, followed by Germany. Instead, in terms of innovation input (ratio of R&D on added value) the amount is highest for Sweden. With respect to energy taxes, we can recognize that Italy, together with the Czech Republic, is one of the countries with the highest amount of taxes, within-sector as well as in downstream and upstream sectors. Sector DD (wood products) and sector DL (electrical and optical equipment) are those sectors respectively with the lowest and the highest innovation output.
Descriptive statistics
Finally, Figure 3 describes aggregate trends of the intensity (per value added) of energy taxes by country, aggregated for all manufacturing sectors. While the intensity of energy taxes on value added tends to increase in the Czech Republic and Belgium, a decrease is observed for Italy and no specific pattern is visible for other countries.
Results

Direct links between environmental regulations and competitiveness
Before commenting on the results of our econometric exercise, it is worth discussing the extent to which our variables correlate each other. The correlation matrix (Table 3 ) of our variables of interest 14 shows a quite high value for correlation between upstream and downstream energy tax intensity (about .93), between TFP and labour productivity (about .73), between patents and R&D (about .64), between average wage and patent stock (about .54) and between labour productivity and patent stock (about .51), while all other correlations are smaller than .5. The high correlation between upstream and downstream energy tax intensity is particularly relevant for our analysis, in which we should interpret with particular care the estimates in which the two measures appear together.
In Table 4 we show the first step of our estimation strategy, that is the e↵ect played by environmental taxes on patents. In column 1 we estimate a benchmark model, which includes the most common drivers of innova-tion output. Results are in line with expectations: R&D, knowledge stock and human capital (here in terms of average wage), traditional inputs of any knowledge production function, positively and significantly a↵ect patent applications. Once controlling for the input of the knowledge production function, our measure of size of the sector (number of employees) turns out to be insignificant. Finally, patenting is positively related with changes in the presence of big firms in the sector, due to the greater propensity to patent by big firms.
From column 2 onwards we add our main variables of interest one by one 15 . We notice a strong positive e↵ect of within-sector, upstream and downstream stringency, confirming the induced-innovation hypothesis. The classical 'within-sector' inducement (column 2) results in an increase of 2.5 percent in patents in response to an increase of within-sector energy tax intensity by one standard deviation.
The e↵ect of upstream inducement (column 3) is greater in magnitude (increase of 10.7 percent in patents for a one standard deviation increase in upstream energy tax intensity). This evidence suggests the existence of a partial (but relevant) adjustment of the price of intermediate goods due to changes in energy taxes which gives rise to innovations aimed at changing the mix of intermediate inputs in response to the new relative prices of inputs.
Finally, the e↵ect is particularly strong in terms of magnitude for the downstream stringency measure: an increase of downstream energy tax intensity by one standard deviation induces an increase in patents of 13 percent. The relevance of this variable could be driven by the fact that patents are typically covering product innovations which are thus transferred (embodied technical change) to downstream (more regulated) sectors. When putting together all the three measures of energy tax intensity, within-sector and upstream measures disappear both in terms of magnitude of the coe cients and statistical significance, while downstream stringency remains positive and (weakly) significant, suggesting that its e↵ect tends to be the strongest.
In the last two columns we interact each of the upstream and downstream variables with the one measuring the e↵ect of within-sector environmental stringency. We note there is a sort of substitution e↵ect between withinsector and downstream and upstream stringency as drivers of knowledge production, as the sign for the interaction with the downstream tax is negative. This means that holding the 'within-sector' tax constant, the e↵ect of increasing downstream or upstream stringency can more than o↵set the capability of the sector of recovering the investment done to comply with the regulation.
To model the last part of the relationships identified in Figure 1 , we directly estimate the e↵ect of environmental taxes on TFP (Table 5 ) and labour productivity (Table 6 ). In this way we can directly understand whether the strong version of the PH is confirmed. When investigated separately, all three measures of environmental regulatory stringency positively a↵ect productivity, the e↵ect being greater in magnitude for labour productivity rather than TFP. However, when including all three measures in the same specification, while the e↵ect of within-sector energy tax intensity remains unchanged in sign, magnitude and significance, we observe relevant changes in the e↵ect of downstream and upstream measures of energy tax intensity. The e↵ect of downstream energy tax intensity increases substantially in magnitude while the upstream energy tax intensity turns out to have a negative and significant e↵ect on both TFP and labour productivity. Even though these results should be interpreted with caution due to the strong 'within' correlation between downstream and upstream energy tax intensity 16 , they suggest that possible increases in the price of intermediate inputs due to energy taxes could reduce productivity. Finally, interaction terms between within-sector energy tax intensity and downstream and upstream energy tax intensity are insignificant in all cases, suggesting no substitution or complementarity when considering productivity instead of innovation as outcome variable.
Robustness checks
We carry out some sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our results. We only include the specification in which all the variables measuring regulations are considered together without interactions. First, we investigate the extent to which results remain stable when we exclude Germany. Indeed, this country, even though not showing the highest amount of patent and R&D intensity is nevertheless the biggest in term of size as shown by the high value of the variable measuring the number of employees. Looking at the first column of Table 9 , we see that results are confirmed as downstream energy taxes generate a positive e↵ect on patents. Then, we exclude the two sectors with the highest (DL -electrical and optical equipment) and lowest (DD -wood and wood products) R&D intensity and, finally, sector DF (coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel) which is somewhat an outlier in terms of within-sector energy tax intensity and is very small in terms on value added and number of employees in many countries. We note that, excluding DD, the e↵ect of downstream and upstream energy taxes disappears and only direct e↵ect is positive and significant. This means that excluding a sector which is weak on the input side of the innovation process can reverberate on the e↵ect generated by downstream or upstream taxes. Instead, excluding DF, a sort of outlier sector while preserving the e↵ect of downstream taxes generates a positive e↵ect also on the side of within-sector taxes. This may be due to the fact that higher energy taxes impact not only through input-output relationship but also they impact through a withinsector e↵ect. Instead, excluding the sector which is the highest in term of technological intensity, DL, does not a↵ect the main results. Table 10 for TFP reports results that are in line with those found in the benchmark regressions. The only exception is the sample without sector DF in which only within-sector taxes are positive and significant.
Mediated e↵ects
Results for the estimates of mediated e↵ects are reported in Tables 7 and  8 for TFP and labour productivity as final outcome variables respectively. In the first line, we report the direct e↵ect of each indicator of energy tax intensity on productivity. In the second line we report the e↵ect of the mediator (patents) on productivity 17 . In the third line we compute the e↵ect of energy taxes on the mediator. In the fourth line we report the indirect e↵ect of energy taxes on productivity (given by the product between the e↵ect of energy taxes on the mediator and the e↵ect of the mediator on productivity) and, finally, in the last line we report the overall e↵ect of energy taxes on productivity (given by the sum of direct and indirect e↵ects). We first note that we can only account for a significant direct and overall e↵ect for the within-sector and downstream taxes. These e↵ects can be decomposed into a direct e↵ect, which implies testing whether taxes a↵ect productivity directly, and an indirect e↵ect implying testing whether taxes a↵ects productivity through patents. The main result we get is that while energy taxes directly a↵ect productivity, patents are not a good mediator. Indeed, we get insignificant results for the coe cient measuring the e↵ect of patents on productivity. This leads us to conclude that patents even though positively a↵ected by energy taxes, as shown by the previous results, do not act as a mediator of the e↵ect observed when investigating the strong version of PH.
Conclusion
Although di↵erent versions of the PH have been analyzed so far, we propose a theoretically similar but empirically di↵erent exercise. What we do in this paper is to dig deeper into the PH by analyzing the extent to which both its strong and weak versions are realized for European manufacturing sectors in 7 countries over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The main novelty we introduce is that we account for the inducement that each sector may receive from regulations not only in the same sector, but also from regulations of upstream and downstream sectors. This has been made possible by using countryand year-specific input-output data provided by the WIOD database. In particular, we focus on the role played by energy taxes, a measure scarcely used to test the PH. A second novelty we introduce is that we do not only measure the 'direct' e↵ect coming from energy taxes respectively on patents and productivity but we also measure the 'indirect' e↵ects of energy taxes on productivity transmitted by their e↵ect on patents.
The results we get with respect to the first step of the analysis reveal that the strongest e↵ects both on patents and productivity come from downstream taxes. The reason we give is that higher taxes for downstream sectors induce their corresponding upstream sectors to innovate in order to generate new adequate intermediate goods which could improve energy e ciency of the downstream sectors. Upstream sectors act as specialized suppliers of technology, as described in the theoretical model by Heyes and Kapur (2011) . These type of taxes are also those that generate a higher e↵ect on productivity. However, when coming to measure the indirect e↵ect generated by taxes through induced innovation, patents are not good mediators for such e↵ect.
Therefore the investigation of other channels of transmissions through which the e↵ect of the strong version of the PH are realized can be an important issue on which further research can concentrate. 
(3) Productivity 
1 0 . 2 3 8 2 * 0 . 0 6 9 2 0 . 0 7 4 7 0 . 0 8 2 3 log(patent stock) (7) 1 0 . 5 3 9 6 * -0 . 2 3 4 2 * -0 . 1 0 1 2 log(average wage) Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
